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Abstract. Airports create many benefits for their regions, but 
they also put a great burden on residents and communities in 
the near vicinity. The environmental impact is considerable. 
Naturally, growth and expansion plans for airports quickly 
generate controversy and resistance. Munich Airport (MUC), 
Germany’s second-largest airport after Frankfurt, has long 
planned to construct a third 4 km runway to increase capacity 
and ensure MUC’s position in a fiercely competitive aviation 
market. A 2012 citizen referendum has stopped these plans.  
 
This article examines the needs, instruments, limits and poten-
tials of airport communications with its key stakeholders, us-
ing the example of MUC, in the context of the runway project. 
It finds that innovative means opened up important channels 
for communication and citizen participation, but partly failed 
because of the inherent political conflicts between the airport 
and neighboring communities which prevented consensus. Ef-
forts of information and dialog are not sufficient to win public 
support. More active mobilization of citizen, business and me-
dia support is necessary to put voiceful opposition at bay. 
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Introduction  
Munich Airport started its operations in 1939 in Riem, East-
ern Munich, under the name München‐Riem Airport. As the 
airport expanded, the vicinity to the city of Munich became a 
problem and operations were moved to an area called Erdinger 
Moos, which is located 28,5 km northeast of the City Center, 
in 1992. Plans for this new airport went back to 1969. Along 
with the relocation, the name was changed to “Flughafen 
München Franz Josef Strauß,” named after a legendary Bavar-
ian premier. More commonly in the aviation community, it 
simply goes by its IATA code, MUC. 
The airport – via the Flughafen München GmbH (FMG) – 
is a public enterprise, co-owned by the State of Bavaria (51%), 
the Federal Republic of Germany (26%) and the City of Mu-
nich (23%) (FMG, 2014a). Today, Munich is Germany’s sec-
ond-busiest passenger airport and ranks sixth in Europe with 
38.4 million passengers and around 400.000 take‐offs and 
landings in 2012 (FMG, 2013a).  
Due to an increasing tendency in passenger numbers and 
resulting capacity restrictions, the airport in 2005 released 
plans to build a new runway, in addition to the two existing 
ones. Ever since, this project has been an conflict-laden issue 
between the airport, society and politics. As of this writing, no 
consensual agreement has been reached. The runway is 
steeped in controversy. 
MUC Expansion Plan 
Munich Airport serves around 38 million passengers and 
398,000 flight movements a year (FMG, 2014b). It currently 
operates two terminals. Terminal 1 has a capacity of around 
20 million passengers a year. Its younger sister, Terminal 2, is 
a joint venture between Flughafen München GmbH and 
Deutsche Lufthansa, with Lufthansa having a 40 percent stake 
in the joint venture (Terminal 2, 2014). Operations started in 
2003. The terminal has a capacity of 20-25 million passengers 
a year. All Star Alliance member or partner airlines operate 
from Terminal 2. Due to capacity shortages, a satellite termi-
nal is currently under construction, enlarging passenger capac-
ity for Munich’s Terminal 2 by around 11 million passengers. 
Terminal 2 and the satellite will be connected via a suburban 
passway. There will be 52 gates and 27 new aircraft parking 
positions, which is double the number of gate parking posi-
tions today (FMG, 2014c).  
MUC manages two parallel runways, which are both 4,000 
meters long, 60 meters wide and 2,300 meters apart from each 
other, which allows simultaneous operations. In optimal 
weather conditions, the minimum clearance between two 
landing aircraft is 4.6 km and 5.5 km between two departing 
aircraft (FMG, 2014d), which makes a maximum slot capacity  
of  90  movements  per  hour (ACI, 2011).  Between  10  p.m.  
and  6  a.m.  night  curfew regulations apply and only very 
restricted operations are possible (Boeing, 2011). 
The third runway 
Since 1992, the first year of MUC operations at the Erdinger 
Moos, the number of passengers has tripled. Until the year 
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2025 experts expect 58.2 million passengers per year to fly in 
and out of Munich. It is not only the number of passengers that 
is expected to increase, but also the volume of air cargo.  
Already today, at peak times, MUC’s two‐runway system 
faces considerable capacity problems and no additional slots 
could be allocated anymore. According to the management of 
Munich Airport, the traffic forecast for 2025 exceeds today’s 
airport capacity, which means that airlines are not keen on 
adding destinations or flights at Munich Airport and the ac-
quisition of new airlines as customers is difficult, as free slots 
only exist during off‐peak times – which is not very attractive 
for the customers. 
 
 
Figure 1. Commercial passengers at Munich Airport by year, 
1992-2013, in millions (FMG, 2014n). 
 
 
Figure 2. Air transport movements (ATM) at Munich Airport 
by year, 1992-2013, in thousands (FMG, 2014o). 
 
In 2005, this perspective led MUC’s supervisory board to 
the decision to build a third runway. The dimensions of the 
new runway are the same as the dimensions of the two existing 
ones: 4,000 meters long and 60 meters wide. The lateral dis-
tance will be 1,180 meters with a 2,100 meters offset in rela-
tion to the existing runway system in north eastern direction 
(FMG, 2014e).  
The position of the new runway was chosen from 25 possi-
ble locations. All of those possibilities were evaluated regard-
ing noise and environmental aspects. With the third runway, 
the slot capacity would increase to 120 flight movements per 
hour (FMG, 2014f). The costs of the project are estimated at 
€1.2 billion (Airliners, 2013). According to the airport, the 
third runway is essential to stay competitive and strengthen 
MUC’s position as an international hub, as more and more 
passengers choose MUC as a transfer airport, mainly due to 
its minimum connecting time of 30 minutes (FMG, 2014g; 
FMG, 2014h).  
The expansion plans were handed over to the state’s district 
government of Upper Bavaria (Oberbayern)1 which reviewed 
the documents and authorized the plans in 2007. After author-
ization the documents were published, which was followed by 
almost 60.000 official objections by affected citizens. In the 
upcoming years, all objections were reviewed and counterar-
guments were compiled by the airport. The documents again 
were submitted to the government of Upper Bavaria, which in 
                                                                    
1 This government, “Regierung von Oberbayern” is an administrative district authority of the federal state of Bavaria. It covers 20 counties (Landkreise) 
and three self-administrating cities (kreisfreie Städte). The district government is an interface between the Bavarian state ministries and the county and 
municipal level. It is not headed by an elected official but a president appointed by the state. 
2011 gave permission for the construction of the third runway 
after having evaluated all aspects of the project. In detail, the 
permission includes the following: the third runway can be 
built and operations under all weather conditions and in both 
directions are authorized. The night curfew between 10 p.m. 
and 6 a.m. is also valid for the third runway. The construction 
plans also include technical measures such as an instrument 
landing system (ILS) or an additional apron with 78 parking 
positions (FMG, 2014i).  
 
 
Figure 3. MUC from the South. Terminal 1 is to the left, Ter-
minal 2 at the right. The third runway would be added to the 
Northeast (upper right). The city of Freising is seen in the 
background in the upper far left (Hennies, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, the airport is obliged to make sure that ade-
quate compensation measures are undertaken. For example, 
the airport has to provide an area of around 908 hectares where 
compensation measures regarding flora, fauna, soil and run-
ning waters can be conducted (Regierung von Oberbayern, 
2011). This permission could have been followed by an instant 
start of the construction works, however the airport expected 
legal claims and did not start right away (FMG, 2014j). 
A referendum stops the runway 
In June 2012 a referendum (“Bürgerentscheid”) in Munich 
asked citizens to say yes or no to the city’s support for the 
runway. Citizen groups, environmental groups, the Greens 
and other left-of-center parties campaigned for a no vote. A 
particularly active coalition is “Aktionsbündnis Aufge-
MUCkt,” an anti-expansion alliance founded in 2006 of over 
80 organizations from counties next to the airport. 
They succeeded: A surprisingly clear majority of 54 percent 
voted against the new runway, with 32 percent of eligible cit-
izens participating in the referendum. The referendum, in 
which all of the citizens of Munich but not surrounding coun-
ties could vote, was to clarify the position of Munich, as one 
of three shareholders of the airport company FMG, towards 
the project. The referendum has the same legal force as a city 
council vote. As a result, the city, in the name of its citizens, 
put a hold to the project by veto. Since all three shareholders 
must be unanimous in the runway construction decision, the 
project was effectively stopped despite the pro-expansion at-
titude of the two remaining shareholders, i.e. the Bavarian 
state and the federal government. They are still convinced that 
the expansion is inevitable (Sueddeutsche.de, 2012). 
By law, the referendum was binding for the Munich city ad-
ministration only for one year. This lock-up period has passed. 
The city council is legally free again in its decisions concern-
ing the project. Politically, however, it is a different matter. 
Policy-makers would certainly think twice before they act 
against a clear citizens’ majority vote. Airport CEO Michael 
Kerkloh said the referendum was not “the last word.” Future 
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generations of public representatives could view the issues 
differently. The decisive question was, stated Kerkloh, for 
how long the city would politically feel bound by the citizens’ 
vote (Welt, 2012). This is indeed a delicate question, given 
that the state and the federal government are still in favor of 
expansion and seemingly look for ways to circumvent the lo-
cal blockade. It was telling that Munich mayor Christian Ude, 
a Social Democrat and runway supporter, stressed he accepted 
the result, “no ifs, no buts,” and expressly warned against an-
yone trying to use “back doors” and “tricks” to cheat on the 
citizens’ will (Sueddeutsche.de, 2012; Welt, 2012). He was, it 
must be said, positioning his party in the view of coming state 
(2013) and local (2014) elections. After the elections, things 
may change. 
On a different track, citizens’ objections and legal chal-
lenges to government decisions continued to move through the 
court system. On March 20, 2013, the Bavarian Administra-
tive Court opened proceedings in what became known as the 
“Startbahnprozess,” or runway trial. The court had to examine 
whether the building permit was legally correct. The outcome 
of the referendum has no legal influence on the case (Airliners, 
2013). The airport communicated that if the judicial review of 
the building permit came to a positive result, it expected that 
political hurdles would eventually be overcome. The runway’s 
permit can be put on hold for 15 years and activated when po-
litical conditions allow (dapd, 2013).  
On February 19, 2014, the Bavarian Administrative Court 
delivered its verdict: All 17 complaints were dismissed, all le-
gal costs were imposed on the plaintiffs, and further appeals 
ruled out. Municipalities and environmental groups which had 
been among complainants announced they would file an ap-
peal against denial of leave to appeal at the Federal Adminis-
trative Court. The judge found no fault with the governmental 
planning resolution. He did not accept claims that the airport 
runway was unneeded and airport forecasts were false, nor 
that environmental hazards or natural conservation objectives 
could block construction. The courtroom was packed not only 
with prominent politicians and reporters but with hundreds of 
angry protesters who interrupted proceedings, singing the Ba-
varian anthem and chanting “We are the people” (a refrain 
from the East German revolution of 1989). Police forced pro-
testers from the courtroom (Kirchberger, 2014). 
The Airport’s Stakeholders 
Figure 1 shows the airport’s stakeholders according to Mu-
nich Airport itself. In the following, different stakeholder 
groups and their interest concerning the project will be exam-
ined. The term stakeholders describes those groups which are 
affected economically, environmentally and socially by the 
airport’s operations (Andriof & Waddock, 2002, p. 26).  
An airport has a lot of impact on its direct environment. On 
the one hand, there is a harmful impact through noise, air pol-
lution, waste, traffic congestion, and loss of natural habitats 
and biodiversity. Such ecological impacts are clearly negative. 
They require compensation and careful handling by the air-
port. On the other hand, an airport can add value to a region 
by creating jobs, business income, tax revenues, and mobility. 
For all these impacts, positive and negative, an airport has to 
answer its central stakeholders. 
Stakeholder communication, as the topic of this article and 
in this particular case, is crucial when there is strong opposi-
tion to a strategic project. The group of stakeholders with the 
most ambiguous relationship to the airport is probably the res-
idents in close vicinity of the airport, or the region. Although 
they may profit from the airport when going on holiday or 
business travel or when being employed by the airport, they 
have to live with the constant noise and pollution. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Munich Airport’s central stakeholders. Official 
stakeholder map, adapted from FMG (2014k) 
 
The second stakeholder group is made up of business part-
ners, airlines, tenants and service providers. Naturally, their 
interests considering the building project are very similar to 
those of the airport. If the airport’s business is good, then their 
business usually has good prospects, too. 
The airlines want safe and smooth on‐time operations, 
which can be more easily assured if the airport’s capacity is 
larger. At the same time, airlines aim at extending their desti-
nation portfolio, which, of course, only is possible with spare 
airport capacity.  
Governmental  bodies  and  associations  are  interested  in  
ensuring  safe  air  traffic operations. On a local level, they 
also aim at ensuring economic growth for the region, which 
can gain benefits by growth of air traffic, as additional desti-
nations are offered and more people will visit the region. On 
the other hand, the local governmental bodies are also inter-
ested in minimizing noise and emissions for the region and 
making it more liveable (FMG, 2014k). 
When looking at ministries and governmental authorities on 
the federal level, one has to take a closer look at the public-
private Initiative “Luftverkehr für Deutschland” (Air Traffic 
for Germany), founded in 2003. Among its members are air-
ports Flughafen München GmbH (FMG) and Flughafen 
Frankfurt AG (Fraport), airlines Deutsche Lufthansa AG and 
Air Berlin, Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS, a federal 
government-owned company organized under private law and 
responsible for all air traffic control), and the air transport in-
dustry’ umbrella association BDL, Bundesverband der Deut-
schen Luftverkehrswirtschaft. The  initiative aims at strength-
ening Germany’s competitiveness in international aviation as 
well as at a sustainable development of the air transport indus-
try (BDL, 2014). 
Another very important stakeholder group are the passen-
gers. As customers and users of a public infrastructure utility, 
their main interest is to get from A to B as quickly and con-
veniently as possible (Schaar & Sherry, 2010, p. 3). Finally, 
the media also are a stakeholder. Opponents and supporters of 
the third runway project use diverse media for conveying their 
specific interests, mobilize the public and influence politics. 
The media also serve as an intermediary between the airport 
and the public (Biesiadecka, 2009, p. 268). 
Between all of these stakeholder groups there might be con-
flicting overlaps, such as employees who are simultaneously 
passengers and residents in the airport region. 
Munich 
Airport
Media
Ministries 
and 
Authorities
Politics and 
Associations
Passengers 
and Visitors
Business 
Partners
Airlines and 
Air 
Transport 
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Stakeholder communication 
According to the airport, the ongoing communication and 
dialog with its stakeholders is an important and highly valued 
part of the company’s daily business. Hence, the airport con-
ducts surveys of employees and passengers on a regular basis, 
for example. 
There is an extra department in charge of communication 
with the region and surrounding communities and their citi-
zens. Part of the regular dialog organized by the airport is a 
serial event called “Flughafenforum”, which is a semi‐annual 
information and communication forum event where neighbor-
ing communities and the airport discuss questions regarding 
economic and traffic related development.  
Originating in this communication instrument, the airport 
has created a platform for dialog and discussion between the 
airport and the region accompanying the third runway project 
in 2005 with the purpose to include the region in the whole 
planning and construction process. This platform is the neigh-
borhood community advisory council, or “Nachbarschaftsbei-
rat.” It has around 40 representatives from industrial and com-
mercial stakeholders, labor unions, municipalities, administra-
tive authorities and citizen groups with the common goal to 
achieve a solution that fits the airport’s as well as the region’s 
and its inhabitants’ needs. The advisory council was not set up 
to discuss the merits of the third runway but rather to mitigate 
its consequences and provide a semi-formal arena for negoti-
ations. It runs its own Internet site (nachbarschaftsbeirat.de). 
Initially, citizen groups founded with the clear purpose to 
oppose the third runway were also at the table. They declared 
their withdrawal from the council in 2011: In their mind, there 
was no room for compromise, and they did not want to be a 
fig leaf for the airport’s expansion plans. The council’s activ-
ities were limited to questions regarding road and rail commu-
nication of the airport as well as how compensation money for 
municipalities and local organizations would be spent in case 
of the third runway’s construction. Compensatory funds 
amount up to €100 million, which will only be used for 
measures exceeding the airport’s legal obligation. When the 
opposition citizen groups left the body out of protest, they also 
gave up an opportunity to influence, or even gain from, this 
spending. It has thus been clear that no decision would be able 
to satisfy both supporters and opponents of the runway project 
(Nachbarschaftsbeirat, 2014). 
Airport communications also include monthly reports con-
cerning the airport’s noise and pollutant emissions, as well as 
a permanent hotline for complaints regarding noise. Addition-
ally, the airport offers road shows regarding the progress of 
the third runway project or on-demand discussion events with 
stakeholders. However, the progressing plans to build a third 
runway prompted several citizen groups to stop their partici-
pation in regular discussion events. 
Regarding government and politics as well as sector lobby 
groups, the airport takes a participative approach. It is a mem-
ber of diverse groups and bodies, and it cooperates closely 
with aviation industry and travel/tourism associations. Its Po-
litical Affairs staff unit is in regular consultation with repre-
sentatives of European and German politics. Those activities 
enable a constant exchange of information and policy posi-
tions regarding future projects (FMG, 2014l). 
Analysis and assessment  
The difficulty in this particular discussion is that the biggest 
part of the project’s opponents are resident citizens. Naturally, 
their major concern is the loss of quality of life – and loss of 
residential property value. There are communities that, with a 
third runway, would be affected in a much stronger way by 
noise and air pollution than they are today, as the distance be-
tween the communities and the runways would become 
smaller. Local leaders, town planners, business bodies and 
residents fear that their towns’ future development would be 
restricted by airport facility construction and zoning, and that 
they become unattractive, even “uninhabitable.” Collectively 
and individually, citizens fear and protest significant impair-
ments in their daily lives (Kirchberger, Dritte Startbahn: 
Ortsteile unbewohnbar, 2013). 
The problem that arises here is something very typical for 
large construction projects: usually nobody wants them in his 
near environment. Apart from the question whether a runway, 
a power plant or a factory is important for the prosperity and 
infrastructure of a region, nobody wants to be burdened per-
sonally with the negative aspects of such a project, like noise 
and air pollution or destruction of the scenery, to name a few. 
The phenomenon is commonly known as NIMBY, which 
stands for “not in my backyard.” NIMBY protests may ally 
with more fundamentalist anti-growth opposition. 
Munich Airport has decided, based on traffic forecasts, that 
a third runway is the only chance to stay globally competitive 
in the long‐term future. Such a project, with estimated costs of 
€1.2 billion, has to be based on economic facts and arguments.  
The airport, for example, emphasizes the creation of thou-
sands of new employment opportunities at the airport. It also 
warns that no more slots are available at peak times, which 
can lead to a loss of airlines to other airports – and thus to a 
loss of income and jobs. Another economic argument is that 
the project will be wholly financed out of profits and cash 
flows from ongoing operations rather than by taxpayers’ 
money (Schwendner, 2014). 
Those arguments may be true and quite airtight, however 
they are all very rationalistic and technocratic, and they point 
to broader regional rather than personal benefits. They cannot 
devitalize the main opposition arguments: too much noise pol-
lution, loss of quality of life and destruction of nature. These 
are also factual, but they mobilize people on more emotional 
and personal basis. The key factor is fear of negative change: 
opponents perceive serious risks, or more concretely for the 
locals, threats to their own way of life and the character of 
their communities. They see their protest as personal and col-
lective defense against attacks from an external enemy. Under 
threat, communities may find common cause, close ranks in 
solidarity and fiercely fight back, tending to frame themselves 
in an all-or-nothing, life-or-death fundamentalist mindset. Ac-
cusations that they place their own well-being over the re-
gion’s common good may even make them feel vindicated.  
Basically, the fundamentalist argumentation on both sides 
is not likely to ever reach a perfect middle point which would 
satisfy all parties. A compromise which secures the economic 
benefits and mitigates risks and burdens is only possible when 
some acceptance of a need to compromise, and of a need to 
legitimately place a burden on a minority for the benefit of a 
majority, is perceived by large parts of the public. It has to be 
convinced that the region needs the third runway and that – in 
balanced judgment and social justice – the benefits carry more 
weight than the disadvantages. This cannot be reached by pre-
senting mere facts (Althaus, 2014, forthcoming). 
It must be said that the airport has not gone over the heads 
of its neighbors – even though some of the locals may nega-
tively perceive it that way. At the very beginning of the pro-
cess, the airport realized that the public, especially the neigh-
boring communities, are a vital part of the runway project. The 
advisory council (“Nachbarschaftsbeirat”) was a good and in-
novative approach, as it was meant to encourage dialog and 
participation, and by that secure transparency and good rela-
tionships between the parties (Biesiadecka, 2009, p. 244). 
 The council offered a two-way communication channel. 
The airport set out to fully inform the council in all details. In 
response, the council articulated citizen concerns, demands, 
wishes, recommendations and ideas to the airport which could 
then be transferred to operational planning. While the council 
never had any decision-making power, it has political weight. 
Its leadership has a political role to play as a moderator and 
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facilitator of conflicting interests – to engineer consensus 
through dialog wherever possible, to keep discussions con-
structive, and prevent communication crises. It was, of course, 
clear from the start that an accord would not be reached with 
everyone on everything (Biesiadecka, 2009, p. 245). 
Indeed, it did not. The council was unable to engineer a con-
sensus. If it was meant to be a crisis prevention instrument, it 
failed, since it did not prevent a major setback in the whole 
process: the referendum. The referendum and its outcome cer-
tainly is a substantial crisis for the project and the airport.  
Opponents saw the council as what it was, a consensus-gen-
erating body which would support the runway project. What-
ever participation and communication was possible here, in 
the end the council was not a place to stop the runway. Oppo-
nents sought alternative political means which could result in 
decisions, not just advice and consultation which may be 
deemed meaningless. One alternative was to work through the 
representative parliamentary and party channels. However, 
the airport enjoyed broad support among major and minor par-
ties (Christian Socialists, Social Democrats, Free Democrats, 
Free Voters and Bavarian Party, but not the Greens). When 
politicians’ project support could not be broken, they turned 
to instruments of direct democracy.  
The referendum has its own problems with questionable le-
gitimacy, however. Citizen opinions do not all count with 
equal weight, or not at all: The referendum was a tool in the 
body politic and under the territorial authority of the City of 
Munich. This means that only Munich citizens could vote. 
They made a decision on instructing the city leadership as 
owners of the airport company. But the airport is located about 
30 km northeast of the city center. The residents who will be 
affected most by the project do not live in the city of Munich, 
but in municipalities in the outer county. Munich citizens thus 
decided over the fate of outsiders who had no direct voice. 
Even after the negative outcome of the referendum, the air-
port management is sticking to the expansion plans, backed by 
the non-city shareholders. According to airport CEO Michael 
Kerkloh, the project was authorized by the government and 
has been adjudicated; what becomes of the runway is only a 
question of how long the City of Munich feels politically 
bound to the referendum (Welt, 2012).  
This kind of positioning flies in the face of the promise that 
civic participation is guaranteed. For critics, participation 
looks pro forma only. The process seemed exclusively in the 
hands of an elite of policy-makers, airport managers and tech-
nocrats. If the outcome of the participatory process is not open 
but already fixed beforehand, and citizens feel their opinion 
does not matter, this leads to even bigger opposition among 
the public as the people feel betrayed (Althaus, 2014, 
forthcoming, p. 7). One strong motive for protest is not feeling 
involved in decision‐making and perceiving a pretense of pub-
lic participation (Banthien, 2012, p. 136). 
Beyond dialog: Mobilizing public support 
The construction of an airport or an additional runway for 
an airport located close to populated areas has never been a 
project without strong opposition. This is just part of the deal. 
However, coping with opposition in the right way can lead to 
much more acceptance among the public. 
In many cases, when looking at the big picture, the opposi-
tion may not be more numerous but simply louder. The oppo-
sition also has a higher chance of mobilizing people to action. 
This is quite natural for the psychological and political reasons 
discussed above. Collective benefits will be spread out over 
many, but burdens and threats hit a very concrete part of the 
population. They may combine with a small but influential 
ideological opposition to airport and air traffic growth.  
Generally, opponents are just easier to find. They are more 
visible, as they have a stronger incentive to go public, are more 
passionate about their goals, and might have a lot more to lose 
in case of a realization of the project than the supporters if the 
project is not realized.  
To supporters, too, it may often seem that they are in the 
minority and opponents in the majority. This again might keep 
people who are in favor of the project from making their opin-
ion public, which could convince and mobilize other support-
ers. Voiceful opposition may have a demobilizing effect on 
the supporters and sympathizers. 
For the airport, this means that dialog is only half the an-
swer. Dialog does not mobilize for political action. Consulta-
tive and deliberative practices do not, by themselves, make 
supporters speak up and take on a forceful opposition cam-
paign. That is the problem with a controversial construction 
project. Dialog cannot fully prevent organized opposition and 
their resort to use legal and political tools to delay. Despite 
broad stakeholder communications, the airport at the end of 
the day relies on the ability of government and political lead-
ers to force the runway decision on the opposing minority. 
What airports are not used to, but could do, is try to mobilize 
its supporters who do not dare to go public because it might 
seem that they will be alone with their opinion. The airport, as 
the one in charge for the project, could intervene by extending 
its stakeholder communications to include a campaign-style 
plan to rally public support. The challenge is to identify those 
who are in favor of the plans and mobilize them to go public 
with their opinion to find other supporters. Effectively, the air-
port should convince them to lobby, organize petitions, write 
letters to politicians, market the runway idea via social media 
and word‐of‐mouth – in other words, engage with their neigh-
bors over the fence in support of the airport’s plan.  
However, it is mostly not sufficient to mobilize supporters 
based on economic-rational arguments alone. They have to be 
touched emotionally and find personal enthusiasm about this 
project in order to spread enthusiasm. The airport cannot shy 
away from developing popular, catchy messages. The task at 
hand is not only to create a positive opinion climate for the 
project but to create citizen action supporting it. 
Frankfurt airport has attempted to implement such  a  cam-
paign  during  the  discussion  regarding  its own  expansion 
plans (“JA zu FRA”). In an initiative with airlines Deutsche 
Lufthansa and Condor Flugdienst, Fraport managed to moti-
vate citizens to post pictures of their holidays on the airport 
initiative’s website, or shoot little clips where they announced 
their support in personal testimonials (Ja zu FRA, 2014). 
While Frankfurt’s campaign has its limits and controversies, 
this active approach aims at making supporters’ voices 
stronger in the public’s perception. It aims at making clear that 
there are more supporters than one might assume. In the best 
case, there are even more supporters than opponents (Althaus, 
2014, forthcoming, p. 24). 
It is not the only the supporters among the citizenry that 
should be mobilized but also those in business. Entrepreneurs, 
managers, employers and employees directly linked to the air-
port’s success can have a role to play – making abstract eco-
nomic arguments more concrete, personal, and relevant. In the 
worldwide ranking of exporting countries, Bavaria ranks on 
position 24. The fastest and most economic way of accessing 
interesting new markets such as Brazil, India or China is by 
air traffic and therefore the airport plays a major role in Ba-
varia’s economy (FMG, 2014m). The support from linked 
economic sectors in the ongoing discussion has been rather 
poor, even though many companies are dependent on daily air 
connections to the rest of the world. Munich airport CEO 
Kerkloh complained publicly about the lack of visible support 
from economic stakeholders. “We know that our expansion 
project has many fans in business,” Kerkloh stated. “But many 
of them were not there when it counted” (Welt, 2012). 
Hence, the airport needs to encourage these companies to 
publicly announce their favorable disposition toward the third 
runway. The priority is not to create slick advertising cam-
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paigns with money from interested business but rather to pre-
sent a credible voice from real people. These might be, but are 
not limited to, CEOs stating a personal opinion what the run-
way means for their business and the people who work for 
their company. It requires that they are motivated to do so. 
All of these aspects are closely knit with the necessity to use 
various media in a much more effective way, i.e. through ad-
vertising, videos, print ads in newspapers or radio messages, 
online media, and the like. Visibility comes through media. 
Conclusion 
As this articles has shown, the discussion over the project 
has been going on for around eight years and has been charac-
terized by sharp conflicts between the public and the airport 
that could not have been solved but have only become worse. 
The basis for a trustful relationship between the airport and 
parts of the public has been destroyed and seems irrecoverable 
at the moment. The airport’s image has suffered greatly. Au-
thorization of the construction plans may come soon; it is very 
likely that it is just a matter of time that the airport will add 
the third runway. But protests will not stop any time soon. The 
construction itself will spark new confrontations. It is up to the 
airport to draw the right lessons from the records of partial 
success and partial failure of its stakeholder communications 
construct not only the runway, but repair the damage and build 
a supportive environment for future construction and opera-
tions. 
Links 
 Munich Airport: www.munich-airport.de 
 MUC expansion / third runway: www.muc-ausbau.de 
 Citizen coalition “Aktionsbündnis AufgeMUCkt”: 
http://keine-startbahn3.de  
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